Are Option ARMs the next casualty in the non prime mortgage meltdown war? Wall Street fired the shot heard ’round the world in the mortgage default war by demanding repurchases from subprime lenders. Lenders either closed their doors or waved the white flag and allowed the conquering army to annex them.
The next battle in the mortgage default war may have already been fought and decided long before the soldiers have time to lace up their boots. That battle is the “dirty bomb” that we call the Option ARM. I think Friday afternoon was the equivalent of Paul Revere’s midnight ride.
I received an e-mail from IndyMac Bank, a respectable non-prime and prime lender and leader in the negative amortization loan products, that said:
1- IndyMac Bank is retiring all 12 MAT products over the next few weeks. This is the traditional low start rate, negative amortization loan.
2- They are increasing the minimum payments and reducing the max price. No more four point rebates for mortgage brokers on an intentionally vague product.
3- They cite the popularity of the FlexPay 5/1 ARM for the 12 MAT demise. The Flex Pay 5/1 ARM has a fixed rate for five years with an option to pay less than the interest due which does defer interest. The advantage to the Flex Pay 5/1 ARM is that the potential negative amortization is completely predictable and not subject to the whims of interest rate fluctuations.
Now, three initial thoughts cross my mind:
1- Option ARMs are dead. That’s hard to believe. Jeff Brown states a great case for alternative loan products last week when he says that builders build and lenders lend. He’s been around long enough to know that opportunists capitalize amid fear and vacuums. Lenders with high exposure and nebulous underwriting guidelines will be decimated when the piper comes calling in the form of higher defaults. Lenders with cogent underwriters will survive and cherry pick the good borrowers with this useful loan product.
2- Wall Street is not at war with lenders but is betting on lower interest rates. If the Wall Street securitization departments believe that rates will be materially lower in five years, they would encourage borrowers to lock into a fixed period rather than ‘float” with a monthly ARM product. The fixed period rate loans will fetch a higher value in the secondary mortgage markets. A bit of a conspiracy theory but plausible.
3- IndyMac Bank is one of the more conservative lenders out there and is taking proactive actions to shore up their servicing portfolio because of defaults. Could this be the initial draft of water before the tsunami hits? I fear that this may be the more likely theory.
I have long watched Countrywide Financial because of their sheer size in mortgage origination. They’ve been quite successful in their efforts through three distinct marketing channels: retail, wholesale, and correspondent. They are innovators in product development and have vertically integrated by setting up their own securities brokerage firm. They didn’t wait for the mountain to come to Mohammed. They brought Mohammed to the mountain.
Countrywide was the largest originator of what they call “Pay Option ARMs” in 2004 and 2005. They were successful by offering large yield spread premiums to the mortgage brokerage community for these products. They knew that unscrupulous brokers and originators would “sell” the low 1% start rate while ignoring the fully-indexed rate charged to a customer. World Savings, the long-time leader in this product offered a 2% rebate to originators, Countrywide offered up to 4.5% rebate (with inflated rates to compensate). Basically, it was prestidigitation.
Let me explain my paranoia. My good friend and colleague, Sean Purcell, has long been a doubting Thomas of the modern negative amortization loan product. He summed it up best when he asked me, “Don’t you think there will be a problem when a lender pays a 4% commission while other lenders usually pay 1.5-2%?“. That, folks, is the ticking time bomb.
Here are some warning signs the painfullly paranoid (like me) might feed upon:
1- Countrywide Announces Change in Board Of Directors
2- Fitch Ratings Agency Downgrades 33% of Countrywide Loan Pools; particularly their “expanded criteria” guidelines which include Pay Option ARMs
3- Methinks he doth protesteth too much; Chairman and Founder Angelo Mozilo sold $140 million worth of stock last year while literally screaming that Countrywide should not be penalized by stock traders because of the subprime meltdown.
Negative amortization loans are an excellent financial planning tool. Countrywide has long been a favorite of originators because of their adaptability and innovative lending products. This time, I think they may have overreached. I’m raising our readiness condition to DefCon-4.
Jeff Brown says:
This scenario isn’t a total surprise, if it actually turns into a tsunami of lenders dumping the traditional neg-am programs. That said, the lenders will find a way to lend.
I steadfastly believe that a contributing factor in this whole thing is the lender and secondary market greed in consistently raising the margins. They insisted on raising the yield to heights which never made sense to me. I don’t see where an almost 9% indexed rate is justified with an investor putting 10% down, a 750 FICO, and six figures in cash reserves. That same lender would have loaned that same borrower on the same property at almost 1/3 less interest if it had been fixed. The premium, in my opinion just hasn’t been justifiable for a long time.
Am I out of bounds here Brian?
Great post.
April 1, 2007 — 9:03 pm
Brian Brady says:
Not at all, Jeff.
It was that sleight of hand trick that crept into the market over the last 3-4 years. We’ll go back to 1994 for a few months, then back to 2001 when u/w guides were sober and margins (and the requisite ysp) were fair
April 1, 2007 — 9:10 pm
Jeff Brown says:
And the flexes might be tweaked to become just a little more attractive.
That’s me begging. π
April 1, 2007 — 9:37 pm
Todd Carpenter says:
I don’t think Option ARMs are going away until Washington Mutual says they will. WaMu owned the market long before the predators came along and abused it. I believe they will keep the program for it’s appropriate clients for the indefinite future.
April 1, 2007 — 11:12 pm
Brian Brady says:
Correct you are, Todd. WaMu practices a more sound underwriting than the new kids on the block
April 1, 2007 — 11:59 pm
Jay Matthews says:
You’re always an eye opener, Brian.
April 2, 2007 — 6:10 am
Jeff Brown says:
Todd – A solid observation. If WAMU deserts ARM’s I’d be more than a little surprised also.
April 2, 2007 — 8:37 am
Brian Brady says:
Another Countrywide watcher:
http://activerain.com/blogsview/67400/-Countrywide-Foreclosures-As
April 2, 2007 — 2:15 pm
Sean Purcell says:
Great Post Brian,
You are, as always, impressive and persuasive.
I agree with the last couple of comments in that Option Arms may never go away… nor should they. The Option Arm is a tool and is inherently neither good nor bad. The abuse in our industry, however, has been stunning. This product was never intended to help people buy homes they could not afford. But apparently, if you offer enough of a bribe (read: rebate), many of our brethren will sell their client (aka “mark”) a product they don’t need, at a price they can’t afford, in a way they don’t understand.
On a more interesting note, I have been watching Countrywide along with you. I believe I read recently that Options Arms make up almost 50% of Countrywide’s portfolio. How in the world do they mitigate that risk? We have a product that has never been used in such volume and for which there is no rational risk modeling. What investment strategy are they using to hedge their position? I can not imagine being the VP in charge of risk managment currently at Countrywide. If these products lead to massive defaults, at the very least Countrywide is going to be handing out a lot of free loans to prop up their base and at the very worst will have a repurchase nightmare. Either way we are looking at profit problems. Not to mention the dubious accounting practice many servicers employ of booking the interest payment even when only the minimum payment was received (I do not know if Countrywide employs this practice). You think New Century had a problem when they announced that they had to “restate” their earnings!
I also recently heard Angelo Mozilo giving some nice “corporate speak” about how they have no exposure to the problems of the sub-prime market, but that their earnings may decrease due to the problems in the sub-prime market. Huh? When I was still trading equities we would have called that “softening the ground” a little. It seems highly suggestive to me that we are going to be seeing some earnings restatements from the largest residential lender in the land. Might make for a bumpy ride.
April 2, 2007 — 5:06 pm
Jeff Brown says:
Sean – I have no way of knowing this, but I suspect WAMU has 50% or more in their portfolio in neg-am loans. The difference is that WAMU underwrites their loans with an eye towards reality.
It’s amazing to me how they can lend to an investor using a neg-am – and the borrower’s FICO is 720 or higher, they have five figures in cash reserves, sometimes six, and investment experience. And yet that loan is called subprime.
Compared to what?
April 2, 2007 — 6:23 pm
Brian Brady says:
How do the press let Mozilo get away with the “corporate speak”? I saw the exact same quote and it astonished me, Sean.
I might turn his next “statement’ over to Bloodhound’s resident logician for analysis
April 2, 2007 — 7:32 pm
Jeff Brown says:
>I might turn his next “statement’ over to Bloodhound’s resident logician for analysis.
Kinda harsh don’t ya think? π
April 2, 2007 — 7:59 pm
Brian Brady says:
No, Jeff! I mean it with the highest respect for our logicians. Sometimes, that’s the problem with the written word; it doesn’t reflect the tone you meant to convey.
The forthright, clear and dispassionate analysis on Bloodhound is what attracted me to this place. I can tell you that some of the statements bought by the Wall Street crowd would never pass muster here.
My statement was the meant to be the highest compliment to the authors here. Sean and I are serious. We’ve both worked in the securities biz and are baffled that Countrywide’s earnings comments weren’t criticized.
It may have come out wrong but it is the highest compliment I can pay.
April 2, 2007 — 8:52 pm
Jeff Brown says:
Brian, I was kidding. π
April 2, 2007 — 8:58 pm
Brian Brady says:
Jeff,
Watch me cry at Hallmark commercial next.
April 2, 2007 — 9:02 pm
Matt Heaton says:
A couple other good signs that something stinks at CountryWide.
1. $2+ billion stock buyback program using debt instead of profit. Sounds like they are trying to hold the stock price up while execs continue dump.
2. They are being very tight lipped about their actual exposure to sub-prime and alt-a when everyone knows it is huge. There investment division is hold $60 billion of subprime loans on their books.
3. Mozilo is spinning as hard as he can denying problems everyone knows exist. Flashbacks to Enron…
These guys are setup to take a fall, though I bet they will be able to prolong in longer than some would think.
April 9, 2007 — 2:43 pm
Brian Brady says:
Matt:
I was unaware of the buyback. Buybacks are a great signal that the company believes in the stock price…UNLESS it is financed with debt. Buybacks are an excellent way to use excess cash.
I really don’t think Wall Street understands that the Pay Option ARM is NOT a “prime” product but an Alt-A product. Consider this write up:
http://financial.seekingalpha.com/article/31759
His last point about Bill Miller confounds me; I consider Mr. Miller an astute investor from the Value school. I have seen Mr. Miller ride Maryland National Bank down in the early 90s so even the best of the best strikes out every now and then.
April 9, 2007 — 7:44 pm
Brian Brady says:
Aha! The paranoia has set in!
Countrywide will never get a “sell” rating put on it by a major Wall Street firm; they are in the club, now. Countrywide Securities provides billions of dollars of CMOs to the other firms on the street.
You may see ratings of “market neutral” or “underperform” but none of the club members will put a “sell” reco on Countrywide.
April 9, 2007 — 7:48 pm
NYCJoe says:
Buybacks are also commonly used to sop up a lot of the options that are granted to execs in order to offset the dilution that would otherwise occur.
I also agree, buybacks financed with debt just smell funny.
April 13, 2007 — 4:00 pm
Brian Brady says:
Nice to see you weighing in, Joe. It’s not a complete post without NYC Joe. Welcome back.
April 13, 2007 — 7:32 pm
NYCJoe says:
Thanks Brian – been traveling on business for a while. Trying to catch up.
April 14, 2007 — 2:08 pm